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INTRODUCTION

Constitutional provisions are only as good as the company they keep.
The First Amendment, for example, contains a pair of textual neighborsthe Expression Clauses and the Religion Clauses. Within each set of
clauses, moreover, reside two distinct provisions. While not perfect
likenesses, of course, both the Religion Clauses and the Expression Clauses
are two-headed creatures that further a sometimes harmonious and
sometimes conflicting set of goals. They both arise out of significant
historical backgrounds, and rely on the interpretation of key terms that
embody multiple meanings.
Despite these similarities, the Supreme Court has found a way to chart
a route through the Religion Clauses that seems to elude it when it comes
to the Expression Clauses.' In the religion context, the Court has found

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I am especially grateful to
Christian Turner for insightful feedback on this essay. I would also like to thank Lindsay Sain Jones for
her research assistance.
1.
See Zod Robinson, What Is a "Religious Institution"?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 189 (2014)
(observing that "where-as the Press Clause has remained dormant, lower federal courts have been
actively employing the religious institution category, making it unlikely that the Court will abruptly
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meaning in and an active role for both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, famously noting that there needs to be "play in the joints" between
the two. 2 In dealing with the Religion Clauses, the Court has wisely
recognized that the two clauses must peacefully coexist; that the meaning
given one clause inevitably affects the other; and that that reality must play
a role in how the Court interprets and applies the two provisions.
With the Expression Clauses, however, the Court's approach has been
very different.3 One of the two provisions, speech, has received all of the
Court's attention while the other, press, has been all but ignored. While
developing a robust Speech Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
never recognized any constitutional rights or protections based solely in the
Press Clause.4 It has chosen, instead, to decide cases with press issues
under a vague amalgamation of First Amendment rights that apply broadly
to all speakers. These so-called "press" cases, for example, include New
York Times v. Sullivan,5 which protects all speakers from liability without
actual malice when they speak about public conduct of public officials as a
speech and press right, and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,6 which
gives everyone, not just the press, the right of access to criminal
proceedings based on combination of speech, press and assembly rights.
As I have written about elsewhere, this failure of the Court to see the
Press Clause as independent from the Speech Clause has prevented it from
considering other potential rights and protections that could help press
speakers fulfill their unique constitutional functions.' Because the Speech
Clause robustly protects speech and publication, the Press Clause could
play a role in newsgathering. Press speakers, for example, could have
constitutional rights of access to government information, meetings, and
places. The Press Clause could provide members of the press with
protection from liability for minor torts committed during the
reverse gears and disengage from defining the rights holder because of the exclusive nature of the

right").
See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
2.
U.S. 664, 669 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3.
See Robinson, supra note 1, at 189 (observing that "the Court [has] avoid[ed] addressing who
or what is 'the press' for First Amendment purposes," but has been "willing[] to imply a categorical
protection from the Religion Clauses").

4.

See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 456 (1983)

("Thus far the Supreme Court has declined to give independent significance to the phrase 'freedom of
the press.' It has refused to give the press any more protection than an individual enjoys under the

speech clause."); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2011)
(stating that the Court "steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or protection as emanating

solely from the Press Clause").
5.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6.
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (advancing
7.
the principle of press exceptionalism and recognizing the unique functions of the press in our
democracy).
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newsgathering process like trespass, fraud, and breach of duty of loyaltyall common tools used during undercover reporting. An active Press Clause
could give constitutional protections to press speakers who are served with
government subpoenas and search warrants seeking information about their
sources, newsrooms, and work product including potentially a
constitutional testimonial privilege to protect confidential sources.
This Essay thus asks whether there is anything to learn from the
Court's treatment of the Religion Clauses, where it has not found it
necessary to deny one of the clauses its potential power, when considering
the Expression Clauses. It does so by examining the similarities and
differences between the two sets of clauses. Ultimately, this inquiry leads
to the conclusion that the differences between the two do not support the
opposing approaches by the Court. In fact, giving a meaningful role to the
Press Clause is potentially an even less-fraught task than is the challenge of
finding "play in the joints" of the Religion Clauses. Considering the
underlying values of the two sets of clauses emphasizes the need for a more
active Press Clause.
I. COMMON ISSUES
Both the Religion and Expression Clauses involve an underlying
balancing act. On the one side are personal rights that strike at the core of
autonomy and self-realization. On the other are important government
interests in effective regulation and the need to protect others from harm.
With expression, for example, there are individual autonomy and
democracy-enhancing reasons to recognize expansive speech and press
rights. These benefits, however, must be weighed against the
countervailing harms inherent in issues like defamation, privacy, national
security, indecency, and fair trials. Protection of religious freedoms
likewise pits matters of personal conscience against societal needs to
regulate issues of discrimination based on gender, race, sexual orientation
or disability,8 health and welfare, 9 employee benefits,' 0 and so on.

8.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 & n.4
(2012) (holding that the ministerial exception, which is grounded in the Religion Clauses, provides an
affirmative defense to Americans with Disabilities Act claims).
See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 89
9.
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[Religious exemption to state vaccination law] seems to be designed specifically to
advance the interests of individuals who oppose vaccination on theological grounds. Such treatment of
religious interests can justifiably be seen as a reasonable accommodation of the considerations more
directly addressed by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.").
10.
See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Affordable Care
Act's contraception mandate imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiff corporations' rights to the
free exercise of religion).
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In both cases, moreover, there is a general interest in uniformity of law
that makes it problematic to have too many exceptions to generally
applicable laws. This potential conflict between these competing values
underlies the debates in both situations.
What we see in both the Religion Clauses and the Expression Clauses,
therefore, is that within each there is an idealized pull toward overly
inclusive protections with one provision (Speech and Free Exercise) yet
tangible benefits of a more narrow set of rights with the other (Press" and
Establishment). These opposing forces manifest themselves in concerns
that constitutional protections can be both under- and over-inclusive. In
both cases, this issue is evident more specifically in discussions on how to
define key terms-"religion" and "press."
A.

Concerns of Under-InclusiveProtection

With both sets of clauses there is a fear that an overly narrow definition
will exclude those outside of the mainstream. With religion, the concern is
that religious beliefs that do not fit into a traditional organized religious
mold will not be protected. Attempting to avoid this problem in matters of
"religion," therefore, the Court has stated that not all religions are
organized or theistic despite the prominence of such religious beliefs in the
United States.12
Similarly, when thinking about defining the press, there is also a
concern of under-inclusivity. With the press, this issue is often discussed as
a problem of elitism.1 3 The concern is that a definition of the press will
favor established media outlets while leaving the voices of minorities and
the oppressed unheard.1 4 Thus, fears of giving certain groups a special
constitutional status haunt both terms. There is a common instinct,
moreover, to err on the side of constitutional overprotection-the more
religious or expressive freedom the better.
In a nonconstitutional context, the Court has addressed the underinclusivity problem of determining what is a "religion" by telling us that

11.

See West, supra note 4, at 1056-70 (explaining how "a narrower definition of the press can

be both constitutionally acceptable and functionally superior"); West, supra note 7 (proposing that we
look to constitutional roles of the press to narrowly define the press).

12.

See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 189 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The

words 'a Supreme Being' have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion. Long before the
birth of our Judeo-Christian civilization the idea of God had taken hold in many forms."); cf McCreary

Cnty. v. A.C.L.U., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The three most popular religions
in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all
believers-are monotheistic.").
13.
See generally West, supra note 7 (addressing charges that press exceptionalism is a form of
elitism).

14.

See generally id.
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"religion" can include philosophical or moral beliefs.' 5 In that case, United
States v. Seeger,' 6 the Court considered a claim of conscientious objector
status for the military. The statute allowed an exception for those who,
based on "religious training and belief," objected to participation in combat
or war.17 The petitioner said he did not necessarily believe in God, but he
believed in a devotion of goodness and virtue for its own sake.' 8 He said he
based this belief on the teaching of philosophers like Aristotle and Plato. 9
The Court accepted this, and said the question should be whether "the
claimed belief occup[ies] the same place in the life of the objector as an
orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for
exemption." 20
Otherwise, the Court has refused to be in the business of deciding
whether a personal belief is or is not a religion. In United States v.
2
Ballard,
' moreover, the Court said that courts cannot be in the business of
judging the truth of someone's beliefs, explaining that "[h]eresy trials are
foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They
may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs." 2 2
In the speech context, it is also a commonly shared belief that we
should err on the side of more First Amendment protections in order to
prevent government tyranny and to protect individual autonomy. 23 This is
most evident with the appeal of free speech absolutism.
Similarly, there are many scholars and judges who have taken the
stance that if we were to define the "press" it would need to include all or
24
As I have explained in a different article,
practically all speakers.
however, too broad of a definition of the press can lead to excessive

15.

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 189 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The words 'a Supreme Being' have no

narrow technical meaning in the field of religion. Long before the birth of our Judeo-Christian
civilization the idea of God had taken hold in many forms.").

16.
17.

380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 165 (quoting the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 456(j)

(2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 184.
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
Id. at 86.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (internal quotation marks

omitted) ("Likewise, assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a
governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.");

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) ("We have therefore been particularly
vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed

sanctions."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. U.S. 476, 488 (1957) ("Ceaseless vigilance is the
watchword to prevent [an] erosion [of First Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The door
barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and
opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.")
24.
See West, supranote 4, at 1030 n.32.
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overlap with the Speech Clause and ultimately (and somewhat ironically)
to fewer tailored Press Clause rights. 2 5 The problem is that in order for the
Press Clause to mean something different from the Speech Clause, there
needs to be sufficient separation between the two. In other words, the Press
Clause can not apply to everyone. Every individual cannot be a journalist,
and every message cannot also be news. If there is too much overlap, there
is no need for two distinct clauses. Thus, an overly broad view of the press
means that in situations where it is undesirable to give everyone press
rights and privileges, the only choice becomes that no one gets these
protections.2 6
B.

Concerns of Over-Inclusive Protection

While there are reasons to be concerned about limiting religious or
expressive freedoms, there are, at the same time, limits to how broadly
either "religion" or "press" can be defined and still be effective. Both terms
raise risks that being too all encompassing can make the terms, and thus the
constitutional provisions or legal rules relating to them, so broad as to be
either paralyzing or meaningless. Overly broad definitions create
opportunities for pretextual claims of constitutional rights and protections
as well as interfering with needs for uniformity in applying laws.
An overly broad definition of either "religion" or "press" creates the
risk that they will be used pretextually. An individual might, for example,
declare that his religion dictates that he use illegal drugs in order to avoid
criminal charges. A speaker, meanwhile, could claim to be a member of
the press as a way to get out of testifying in a judicial proceeding.27
This was an issue in the religious context in a case involving prisoners
who declared themselves members of the "Church of the New Song." They
claimed First Amendment protection for various acts that were designed
"to cause or encourage disruption of established prison discipline," such as
"a tongue-in-cheek request for prison authorities to supply steak and
wine."28 The district court in this case, after concluding that it could
examine the sincerity of the prisoners' beliefs, concluded that the religion

25.
26.

See id. at 1056-58.
See generally Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (refusing to recognize a "right of

access" under the First Amendment to interview particular prisoners); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,

417 U.S. 843 (1974) (holding that the Federal Bureau of Prisons' prohibition on personal interviews of
designated inmates did not violate the First Amendment); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(holding that a rule prohibiting journalists from interviewing particular inmates and forbidding inmates
from initiating interviews did not violate the First Amendment).

27.

See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011) (interpreting a state reporter's

shield law to not include speakers who post comments on internet message boards.)

28.

See Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
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appears not to be a religion, but rather as a masquerade designed to
obtain First Amendment protection for acts which otherwise would
be unlawful and/or reasonably disallowed by the various prison
authorities but for the attempts which have been and are being
made to classify them as "religious" and, therefore, presumably
protected by the First Amendment.2 9
If taken to extremes, pretextual uses of religion can potentially interfere
with regulations that rely on general application in order to be effective. An
issue of current debate, for example, involves parents who claim a religious
exemption not to vaccinate their children even in cases when their
objections are not sincerely religious. 30 The problem, of course, is that if
too many parents refuse to inoculate their children, dangerous diseases will
spread.
Even when claims of "religion" are not pretextual but are sincerely
held, moreover, an expansive definition risks interfering with the ability of
the government to regulate effectively. This was the primary concern of
Justice Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith,3 1 which involved two
Native Americans who claimed that peyote use was part of their religious
practices.32 While not doubting the sincerity of the belief, the Court
concluded that such a broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause would
"make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 33
The Court expressed the same concern about an overly broad view of
"the press" in the context of the reporter's privilege. In Branzburg v.
Hayes, Chief Justice Burger argued that effective law enforcement would
be compromised if too many people could claim a reporter's privilege and
not have to cooperate with a grand jury subpoena.34

29.

Id.

30.

Compare Editorial, Vaccine Opt-Outs Put Public Health at Risk: Our View, USA TODAY

(Apr.

13, 2014, 9:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/13/vaccines-measles-

misinformation-risks-editorials-debates/7682093/ (contending that state laws make it "too easy" to optout of mandatory vaccines by claiming a "philosophical exemption" and that the parents should only be

able to opt-out for "strictly defined medical or religious reasons"), with Barbara Loe Fisher, Op-Ed.,
Leave Parents Free to Choose Vaccines. Opposing View, USA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2014 9:14 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/13/vaccine-safety-choice-parenting-editorialsdebate/7682095/ ("Non-medical vaccine exemptions immunize individuals and the community against
unsafe, ineffective vaccines and tyranny.").

31.
32.
33.

Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

34.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972) ("We perceive no basis for holding that the
public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting
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Thus, with both the Religion Clauses and the Expression Clauses, there
is a pull toward an overly inclusive definition with one provision yet
benefits of a more narrow definition with the other. They both require the
courts to consider the unique roles of the separate provisions but also keep
in mind the bigger picture. The Court has recognized this challenge
explicitly in the religion context, noting that "'there is room for play in the
joints' between the Clauses" but that the Court must "find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses."35 Each pair of clauses involves two
interacting parts. The treatment of one clause sheds light on the other.
II. EXPRESSION CLAUSES ARE EASIER

Both the Religion and the Expression Clauses present the problem of
walking the line between an all-encompassing or too narrow definition.
The Court has managed to strike a balance that gives both of the Religion
Clauses a practical role to play. The question, then, is whether there is a
similar approach that could be applied to the Expression Clauses. This
section contends that there is. For three reasons, moreover, handling the tug
and pull of the Speech and Press Clauses is likely an even more workable
task than maneuvering through the Religion Clauses.
A.

Two Distinct Terms

In the search for light between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, there is a challenge that is absent with the
Expression Clauses-both Religion Clauses refer to the same term
"religion" whereas the Speech and Press Clauses involve two distinct
terms. The problem this presents is that a broad definition of "religion"
meant to grant expansive free expression rights could potentially curb the
ability of the government to regulate effectively without encountering
Establishment Clause limitations.36 The Court has noticed this quandary,
stating that the clauses "tend to clash" between a desirably narrow
interpretation at times and a broad view in other circumstances.37

that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid
grand jury investigation or criminal trial.").
35.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668-69 (1970)).
36.
Id. But see Carl H. Esbeck, "Play in the Joints Between the Religion Clauses" and Other
Supreme Court Catachreses, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1331, 1333-36 (2006) (arguing that the clauses do
not conflict).
See Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69 ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the
37.
two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.").
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A recent case in California highlighted this dilemma. A court was
charged with determining whether yoga was a "religion" 38 for First
Amendment purposes. Yoga, as the court noted, "has been associated with
Eastern religions, specifically Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism," which in
some forms has a purpose "to attain human salvation and a release from
human suffering and the cycle of Indian rebirths and to ultimately spend
eternity with a universal power, or the divine." 39 An issue arose, however,
when a community foundation began teaching yoga in local public
schools. 4 0 This case highlights the friction between the Religion Clausesdoes declaring the spiritual role of yoga as "religious" for Free Exercise
Clause purposes place too many Establishment Clause limitations on the
government, such as the ability of a public school to teach yoga for "the
physical postures, breathing, and relaxation" as part of its physical
education curriculum? 4 1

The Expression Clauses, however, present no such obstacle. "Speech"
and "press" are two different terms that can and should embrace two
different meanings. The clauses, moreover, in no way conflict. They might
overlap and certainly can reinforce each other, but the Court is free of the
concern that the definition of one term might inadvertently warp the
meaning of the other.
B. Fallback Protections
Neither the Religion nor the Expression Clauses exist in a vacuum. All
constitutional provisions are, of course, but a cog in our multifaceted legal
system. These other constitutional elements can affect how these sets of
clauses function and, in turn, how best to protect the underlying interests.
1. Speech Clause
The relationship between the Speech and Press Clauses is unique.
Unlike the potentially zero sum game of the Religion Clauses-where
expanding rights in one context can lead to restriction in the other-the
Speech and Press Clauses work together. The Speech Clause, in other
words, provides a fallback protection that makes defining the press more
feasible than defining religion because line-drawing perfection is not
necessary.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Sedlock v. Baird, No. 37-2013-00035910 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013).
Id., slip op. at 2.
Id., slip op. at 8-9.
Id., slip op. at 4; see also id., slip op. at 14 (concluding that while yoga has a religious

component to it, the schools were not teaching that aspect in their health and wellness programs).
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The Court's speech jurisprudence is one of constitutional
overprotection. In the speech context, the costs of line-drawing errors are
high and present a risk that a speaker or message will be lost to our public
debate. Censorship can be difficult or impossible to reverse. These
powerful speech rights mean, however, that press protections can be doled
out on a more discerning basis.42 Because declaring a speaker not to be a
press speaker does not leave that speaker out of our public debate, there is
less pressure on the Press Clause side of the equation. All speakers have
robust speech rights that allow these voices to be heard and often to
function in press-like ways. Strong speech protections also leave open
channels for a wrongly excluded speaker to make his or her case for press
status. Speech protections against content-based discrimination, including
viewpoint- and speaker-based discrimination, offer further protection. The
relationship between the Speech and Press Clauses creates a structural
benefit that is unique and allows for constitutional overprotection of speech
rights and a more discerning approach to press protections. Nonpress
speakers remain free to express themselves, including by publishing and
disseminating their messages. Error costs, therefore, are much lower.
The fallback protections of the Speech Clause also address concerns of
elitism. Thanks to advances in communication technology, it is becoming
increasingly easier for nonmainstream speakers to function as the press by
making it cheaper and more accessible for everyone to regularly
communicate information about matters of public concern to a broad and
established audience. This allows more speakers to attain press status, and
if not deemed to be the press, allows them to exercise their strong speech
rights. Courts, therefore, should go forward with confidence that even an
imperfect realization of press rights will have the effect of increasing the
overall universe of expressive freedoms.
Unlike the Speech and Press Clauses, which support the same
structural goals, the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are
frequently at odds with one another, making finding the appropriate
balance of religious freedoms more difficult. Perhaps because of this
conflict, the Speech Clause also has become a fallback protection for
religious freedoms. In a series of cases,43 the Rehnquist Court relied on the

42.
West, supra note 4, at 1058 ("[Olur broad free speech rights for everyone justify a narrow
rights regime for the press.").

43.
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-77 (1981); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
253 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-46 (1995); Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001).
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free. speech principle of content neutrality to protect religious expression.44
According to Professor Mark Cordes, this argument that religious speech
must be treated equally to other types of speech has became a powerful
defense again Establishment Clause claims, "creating a nice symmetry
between the two clauses in regard to religious speech." 45 Shifting the power
center from the Free Exercise Clause to the Speech Clause "has prompted
some concern that if worship is viewed purely a type of speech, its claim to
special protection under the establishment and free exercise clauses may be
diluted."4 6 But it has, nonetheless, taken some pressure off of reliance on
the Free Exercise Clause to fully protect religious freedoms without
clashing with Establishment Clause concerns.
Thus both the Press Clause and the Free Exercise Clause can rely on
the Speech Clause as an important backup provision. But it provides
support for each clause in different ways. In the religion context, the
Speech Clause offers a way to rebalance the scales between the conflicting
interests of religious expression and establishment concerns. In the
expression context, however, the Speech Clause and Press Clause share the
same goals and the Speech Clause provides important breathing room to
recognize for press rights and protections.
2. PoliticalProcess
In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
mentioned another potential fallback protection-the political process.4 7 He
noted that "[v]alues that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from
the political process." 4 8 While acknowledging that reliance on the political
process "will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in," he nonetheless stated that a society "that
believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.' 9
The other branches of government apparently disagreed with Justice
Scalia's faith in the ability of the political process to protect religious

44.

Mark W. Cordes, Religion As Speech: The Growing Role of Free Speech Jurisprudence in

Protecting Religious Liberty, 38 Sw. L. REV. 235, 258 (2008) ("Religion was certainly not given any
preferred status under the Free Speech Clause, but it became clear it could not be given less.")

45.

Id.

46.

Aaron H. Caplan, Review Essay-the First Amendment's Forgotten Clauses, 63 J. LEGAL

EDUC. 532, 549 (2014)
47.
Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
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freedoms, as evidenced by the passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.50 Senator Orrin Hatch stated upon the introduction of the
bill to the Senate, "[i]t is clear to me a legislative response [to the Smith
decision] is critical to the preservation of the full range of religious
freedoms the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantees to the American people,
particularly those whose religious beliefs and practices differ from the
religious majority in our country." 5 1
But even accepting the Court's optimism that the political process will
provide some protection to religious viewpoints, turning to the political
process is an even worse fit for the Press Clause. On the one hand, it is true
that the press has won many legislative victories. As Professor David
Anderson has noted, "the press is far from helpless when forced to make its
case with the legislative and executive branches"5 2 and has won a number
of nonconstitutional rights and protections.
There are reasons, however, to question whether political victories
secured by the press during the "heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme
Court" 54 in the mid-twentieth century will continue thanks to flagging
media resources and dwindling political power.5 5 As Professor Lyrissa
Lidsky has observed, "[m]edia that are economically and politically
powerful, popular with the public, and united in pursuit of common goals
may indeed be able to fight off threats to their ability to play a special role
in our democracy, especially when government officials depend on the
media to carry government messages to the public," but "this theory of
constitutional self-help depends on a number of assumptions about the
media that were largely true in the 1970s but may not be today."" And
considering that the Supreme Court has made clear that one of the primary
purposes of the Press Clause was to serve as a check on the government, 7
50.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
51.
139 CONG. REc. S2824 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
52.
David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REv. 429, 518-19 (2002).
53.
Id. at 485.
54.
Id. at 448.
55.
Lyrissa Lidsky, The Press and Constitutional Self-Help, Then and Now, Presentation at the
University of Georgia Law Review Symposium: The Press and the Constitution 50 Years after New
York Times v. Sullivan (Nov. 6, 2013).
56.

Lyrissa Lidsky, NYT v. Sullivan Anniversary Symposium at U. of Georgia, PRAWFSBLAWG

(Nov. 3, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/1 1/nyt-v-sullivananniversary-symposium.html.
57.
See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (stating that "[tihe press plays a unique
role as a check on government abuse"); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) ("[T]he press will often serve as an important restraint on government.");
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) ("The Government's
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the
Government."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (stating that the "free press has been a mighty
catalyst" in "exposing corruption among public officers and employees").
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it is inherently troubling for the press to function only at the pleasure of the
branches that it is meant to be checking. Justice Scalia noted this difficultly
himself in Citizens United, observing that the concept "that modem
newspapers, since they are incorporated, have free-speech rights only at the
sufferance of Congress, boggles the mind."
3.

Right ofAssociation

Both religious and expressive rights could potentially find fallback
protections in another area of First Amendment doctrine-freedom of
association. While not mentioned directly in the text of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has recognized a right to associate in groups for
expressive activities. 59 Yet here, again, the Court has taken a more
favorable approach for blending associational rights with religious freedom
than with press freedom despite the fact that using rights of association in a
supporting role for press rights is a more natural fit.
While there is some uncertainty on the overlap between religion and
association, the Court nonetheless has noted that "[t]he right to organize
voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and
dissemination of any religious doctrine . .. is unquestioned."60 In some
ostensibly "religion" cases, moreover, it has been observed that it is "the
rights of association and conscience [that] do all of the work." 61 The
Court's willingness to accept some role for rights of association in cases
involving religious freedoms, however, does not come at the expense of
failing to find meaning in the Religion Clauses themselves. In HosannaTabor EvangelicalLutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 6 2 for example, the
Court rejected a right of association claim, stating instead that it could not
"accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say
about" a case involving religion.6 3

58.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 390 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
59.
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing "a right to associate for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly,
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion").

Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871).
60.
61.
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV.
917, 983 (2013).
62.
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see also Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) ("And it is
easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be
reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns."); Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism,

99 VA. L. REv. 1049, 1059-60 (2013) (who is "not persuaded that in considering the legal question of
church autonomy, we must set aside the distinctive history of religious freedom, including those aspects
of the history that involve churches as autonomous institutions").

63.

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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Press speakers, meanwhile, could in theory also raise freedom of
association claims to challenge government regulations that infringe on
newsgathering and disseminating activities. Press litigants, however, have
not done so, and the courts likewise have failed to raise this discussion sua
sponte despite the fact that "courts have not historically imposed rigid
boundaries between the various doctrines and causes of action the First
Amendment provides." 64
A right of association could arise in any case where an otherwise
neutral law places a burden on a group's expressive activities. Thus, in
other associational rights cases, the Court has employed a balancing test
that weighs the burden on the expressive activity against the government
interest in its regulation. 6 5
In cases involving the press, however, the Court has not engaged in the
balancing test but rather "almost uniformly dismiss[es] such claims on the
ground that a press entity is not entitled to a special exemption from
content-neutral governmental actions."66 The Court, therefore, has never
recognized associational rights for members of the press, and instead places
all the workload on the Press Clause, which it then in turn refuses to infuse
with real meaning. It has done this despite potential opportunities in areas
involving regulations requiring some press speakers to disseminate the
speech of others or disclose the names of sources or group members.
Employing the right of association as a fallback protection for the
press, however, is a logical fit for press rights. It simply requires
recognizing the unique constitutional functions of certain press speakers as
a group. An example offered by Christopher Edgar comes from the
Supreme Court case of Pell v. Procunier,6 8 which involved a prison
regulation that prohibited interviews with inmates. From the Court's point
of view, "the fact that the press was not subject to harsher restrictions than
the general public was wholly dispositive of the claim." 69 Yet it was a legal
fiction to suggest that the anti-interview rule affected all speakers the same
way. In reality, it placed a heavier burden on an expressive group
consisting of reporters and inmates who wished to "collaborat[e] for the

64.

Christopher R. Edgar, The Right to Freedom of Expressive Association and the Press, 55

STAN. L. REv. 191, 198 (2002).
65.
See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984) (comparing the state's
interest in "[a]ssuring . . . equal access" with the burdens imposed on the "male members' freedom of
expressive association" and concluding that the Jaycees failed to demonstrate that the state's anti-

discrimination Act "imposes any serious burdens").
66.
Edgar, supranote 64, at 234.
67.
See id at 247 (raising these two examples "of cases in which governmental actions have had a
deterrent effect on press entities' expressive activities" in order "to show that the press has not been
afforded the same degree of associational protection as the doctrine's typical beneficiaries").

68.
69.

417 U.S. 817 (1974).
Edgar, supra note 64, at 239.
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purpose of disseminating the information obtained from the interviewee to
the newspaper's audience."7 Viewing the press more narrowly would
allow the Court to recognize rights of association for the group fulfilling
particular functions.
C. Functions Versus Beliefs
Recognizing press rights is a potentially easier task than interpretation
of the Religion Clauses for another important reason. The Press Clause
does not involve the same issues of personal, historical, and philosophical
importance as does religion in our pluralistic society.7 1 Religion is a belief
or practice, whereas the press is best thought of as a role or a function.
Separating press speakers from nonpress speakers is a task of
identifying those who are fulfilling certain functions (informing the public
and checking the government).72 Looking for the speakers who are most
effectively doing these things is a task the courts are capable of
undertaking. Press speakers are fulfilling a public function, and there are
proxies and standards that can help the courts identify them.
Religion, however, is an entirely different beast. Religion is an
inherently personal belief system. It is a matter of conscience, self-identity,
and self-realization and part of the autonomous nature of personhood.73 It
has been noted that the mere act of defining "religion" might constitute an
establishment of it7 4 and "religion is itself especially unamenable to
definition."7 In this manner it is far more comparable to our speech rights
that serve both a self-actualization purpose as well as structural functions

70.
71.

Id.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A zeal for

different opinions concerning religion . . [has], in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
co-operate for their common good.").

72.

See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (contending

that the "Stealth Press Clause" has revealed that the press fulfills two unique constitutional roles: (1)
gathering and disseminating news to the public, and (2) providing a check on the government and the
powerful).
See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
73.

346, 350 (2002) ("[B]y the late eighteenth century, American rationalists and evangelicals alike argued,
in terms identifiably derived from John Locke, that the purpose of nonestablishment was to protect the

liberty of conscience of religious dissenters from the coercive power of government.").
74.

See Francis J. Conklin, S.J., Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of

Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252, 277 (1963) (arguing that because any attempt to define "religion"
excludes "some opinions which a small minority may choose to call religion . . . any such attempt is
automatically unconstitutional"); Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A
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UnderstandingofReligion Under the FirstAmendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 829-30 (1978) ("[T]oo
narrow a judicial definition of religion might effect an impermissible establishment of religion.").
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furthering democracy. Courts cannot and indeed should not be in the
business of standing in judgment on such personal matters as one's
religion.
As discussed earlier, the problem of pretextual claims is one that
plagues both sets of clauses. Yet with the press, there is no concern with
judging someone's religion or the sincerity of his or her belief. In cases
involving the Press Clause, rather, the focus can be on function, not on
personal belief. A functional inquiry could weed out a speaker claiming to
be the press merely to gain access to information or to claim a testimonial
or other privilege. If the speaker, for example, does not have a history of
regular publication and an established audience, they are likely not
functioning as the press. In addition to functional inquiries regarding
whether speakers are effectively checking the government and informing
the public, there are also reliable proxies to help us identify press speakers
including listening to institutional cues.76
III. RECOGNIZING UNDERLYING VALUES

Finally, there is another important parallel and significant difference
between the Religion Clauses and the Expression Clauses. This involves
the primary values the pairs are trying to further and the way each clause
functions to further those goals.
With each pair of clauses there is an overarching purpose, and each
pair has one clause that enhances that purpose primarily as an individual
right and one that enhances that purpose primarily as a societal right. The
Court has elaborated somewhat on the functions of the Religion Clauses,
but has done much more about the Expression Clauses.
The Religion Clauses protect a type of freedom of conscience.77 They
do this in two ways: first by granting an individual right to practice religion
without undue government interference and, second, by prohibiting the
government from inflicting upon both individuals and society as a whole a
particular religious orthodoxy.

76.
See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 146 (2013) (stating that the
press as an institution "is identifiable and long established; it is a major part of the infrastructure of
public discourse; it follows its own norms, practices, and self-regulatory standards; and it is fully (if
imperfectly) capable of acting autonomously"); Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARv. L.

REV. (forthcoming 2014) ("Thus, by credentialing, hiring, conferring degrees upon, or in other ways
recognizing individuals as the press, journalistic institutions give us important cues regarding who is
serving the core purposes of the press.").

77.

But see Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1353

(2012) (challenging the notion that religious beliefs are special as compared with secular ethical and

moral beliefs.)
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United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It
not only 'forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
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It is possible to look at the Expression Clauses as having a similar
format. The Expression Clauses protect the value of positive information
flow. The Speech Clause provides an individual right to express oneself
without undue government interference, and the Press Clause prohibits the
government from pushing upon its citizens a kind of official orthodoxy.
The orthodoxy here, however, is different. It is an orthodoxy of fact.79 The
Press Clause gives citizens the freedom, via a structural check, to challenge
a government message that claims to be a message of fact.so
In addition to the value of autonomous individual speech, the Speech
Clause can also further the value of checking orthodoxy of fact. But there
are reasons to think that it does so less effectively than the Press Clause
could, because furthering this value requires not just protecting speech but
protecting the act of gathering and analyzing the necessary information.
Furthering this role for the Press Clause, however, requires providing
rights and protections for certain speakers in situations where the Speech
Clause does not fill that role. It is infeasible to give these tools to all
speakers for reasons already mentioned. But it is also a failure to the value
of protecting an informed citizenry to deny them to all speakers.
The Press Clause could and should provide an additional weapon in
battling the official orthodoxy of government "truth" (as well as, perhaps,
the "truth" purported by powerful private persons and entities) much like
the Religion Clauses resist the establishment of government religious
"truth." It is possible for us to identify situations that are unusually helpful
to the information flow situation in a way that is not too harmful to the
competing value of having uniform government regulation. Drawing this
line cannot be done perfectly, of course, but it can be done effectively
enough.

worship' but also 'safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion."') (quoting Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
79.

I owe thanks and credit to Christian Turner for suggesting this framework and much of the

phrasing used to discuss it.
In the years following the September llth terrorist attacks, the press acted as an important
80.
check on the government by reporting on the Bush Administration's policy on torture of detainees. For

example, in June of 2004, the New York Times released a story describing leaked memorandums that
had been prepared for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stating that Executive Branch officials could
be immune from domestic and international prohibitions against torture. Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt,
Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/08/politics/08ABUS.html. In the most famous example of the press

checking the government, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the Washington Post uncovered
President Nixon's involvement in the Watergate scandal, which ultimately led to his resignation. For a

complete description of the series of events leading up to President Nixon's resignation, see The
Watergate Story, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/watergate/ (last visited May 6,2014).
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CONCLUSION

An abdication of the Press Clause reflects the most basic of analytical
errors: It treats the text of the Press Clause as redundant and ignores the
specialized functions that the Framers meant for the Press Clause to play.
Failing to give the Press Clause constitutional recognition by declaring it
too difficult to interpret or by dismissing it as "mere surplusage" 82 is utterly
at odds with our constitutional traditions. The Religion Clauses provide an
example on how to give the text of the Press Clause true meaning.
In interpreting the Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court has taken a
different attitude than it has with the Expression Clauses. Most notably, it
did not find it necessary to deny one of the two clauses its potential power.
To be sure, the path it forged is controversial. But controversy is hardly
unique to the Court's constitutional interpretation. What is important is that
the Court in dealing with the clauses has found it possible, indeed
necessary, to view each interdependent provision as having important work
to do. And so it should be with the Speech and Press Clauses.
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West, supra note 4, at 1033.
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